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Abstract 
In this paper, we modify the Harris-Todaro model of migration to incorporate the impact of 
human capital, housing stock and the availability of publicly provided goods like health care 
and road provision in order to analyse the determinants of migration in different regions of 
Poland. We apply the Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equation [SURE] model to 
investigate the data. Our results show that GDP per capita, unemployment and distance have 
a strong effect on regional migration in this country.  Human capital is also an important 
explanatory factor as is the provision of key publicly provided facilities such as roads. The 
lack of housing in Poland is important in explaining the low levels of internal migration.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 In their seminal contributions to the economic literature, Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro 
(1970) identified real wage gaps and the probability of finding employment as the major factors 
behind migration. In the light of such models, it is easy to understand why strong migration 
pressures exist in some transition economies (Fassman and Munz, 1994; Ghatak et al., 1996; 
Levine, 1999:  Ghatak and Sassoon, 2001; Hatton and Williamson, 1998; Straubhaar and 
Zimmermann, 1992). Migration has become one of the most important factors affecting 
economic development in the 21st century (Agiomirgianakis, G. 1999, 2001; Hatton, 2001; 
Sheilds and Wheatley Price, 1998; Wheatley Price, 2001). On the other hand such models 
should also help explain why some economies have low or declining inter-regional migration. 
Traditional economic models can be inadequate in explaining current regional migration in 
transition economies as they ignore the role of a number of important factors like human capital, 
housing and the availability of publicly provided goods such as health care and transport 
infrastructure.  
 
 This paper focuses on the major economic causes of internal migration within Poland. Similar 
to other transition economies, Poland exhibits a polarisation of its economy with growing gaps 
between regions as well as increasing rates of unemployment (see figs 3 and 4). In view of 
traditional migration models it would be expected that internal mobility would reduce such gaps 
with migrants moving from depressed areas to more advanced regions. However, this is not 
happening as Poland shows very low rates of internal migration (Fidrmuc 2003 and Bornhorst 
and Commander 2004). The understanding of the migration dynamics of countries such as 
Poland, which have recently entered the EU, is a part of  the complex overall  picture of intra-
European migration and labour mobility. 
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The paper will address three specific issues. First, we will examine the role of conventional 
factors like  wage and unemployment differentials in the context of the Harris-Todaro (H-T) 
model to explain regional migration within Poland. We also include distance as an explanatory 
variable. Next, the role of other factors is incorporated. We examine the role of infrastructure 
provision (mostly publicly provided goods) in a region in terms of housing, health care and road 
provision.  These factors are of particular relevance in understanding the inter-regional dynamics 
of migration in European transition economies (Deichmann and Henderson, 1996; Andrienko 
and Guriev, 2004).  
 
Economic theory suggests significant gains from free factor movements as long as labour 
markets clear. A study by Hamilton and Whalley (1984) suggests that at a world-wide level free 
labour mobility would bring about huge efficiency gains. However at the opposite extreme 
Brecher and Choudhri (1987) show that if real wages are fixed then the optimal degree of labour 
migration is zero. These contrasting results highlight the importance of assessing the welfare 
economics of migration models with properly specified and estimated labour markets. In the 
next section, we will develop models of different types of labour market behaviour that are 
characterised by wage–gaps, different marginal labour productivities and different employment 
probabilities. Thirdly, we modify the standard H-T model to incorporate the impact of human 
capital (the educational level of the migrant) to analyse the migration decision. Section 2 of this 
paper provides the theoretical model.  In section 3, we describe the data, sources and key 
background literature. In section 4, we apply the Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model 
[SURE] to examine the data.  Section 5 concludes. 
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2.   A theoretical model of migration 
Our theoretical model of migration is based on the Harris-Todaro (1970) model of rural-
urban migration, hereafter referred to as H-T. The future expected income from migration is 
given by 
    CWPPW
r
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where C is the direct cost of migration, r is the migrants’ discount rate, P is the probability of 
employment at real wage Wu and Wb is the real income received if unemployed or employed 
in the informal sector. The would-be migrants compare (2.1) with the future income from 
remaining in the rural sector. 
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If employment is a certain prospect (i.e. P=1) then migration takes place only if there are 
gains from moving, i.e., only if 
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Under conditions of uncertainty, the probability of obtaining employment is given by 
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where L is population employed, N is total population and M is the rate of migrants coming 
from the rural region and the subscript u refers to urban regions while r refers to rural areas. 
Equation (2.4) assumes that migrants compete on equal terms with the incumbent urban 
employed population. Thus as M rises, P falls and migration continues only until the returns 
from (2.1) and (2.2) are exactly equal. Hence, the equilibrium migration rate M is given by 
rCWWPPW rbu  )1(                                                          (2.5) 
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with P given by (2.4). Substituting (2.4) into (2.5) and solving for M gives the equilibrium 
migration rate. Equation 2.5 is derived assuming equality holds in 2.3. 
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We require that Wb-Wr<rC for M>0 which implies there is no incentive to leave rural areas 
for urban unemployment. 
From (2.6), we get the familiar results 
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Inequalities (2.7) state that any marginal increase in urban wage (Wu) or decrease in the rural 
wage (Wr) will increase migration. Paradoxically, any policy to increase employment in the 
advanced urban sector will raise the migration rate and may increase urban unemployment. 
Hence, as predicted in the H-T models, a policy of creating more employment opportunities 
in the advanced regions may only enlarge the migration from the backward region. Also, any 
decrease in the cost of migration will increase M. Clearly, the H-T model ignores the impact 
of human capital, availability of public goods like health care, housing stock and road 
infrastructure in migration decisions. Later, we extend the H-T model to include the impact of 
such factors.  
 
Figure 1 explains the gains and losses of migration. The benefits and costs of such migration 
will be clearly identified from the point of view of both the host and the donor regions. In fig 1, 
we show the pre and post-migration labour market in different regions of an economy.  Due 
to the access to superior technology, better organisation and human capital, the marginal 
productivity of labour (MPL) in the advanced (“urban”) region is higher than in the backward 
(“rural”) region as shown by the positions of MPLW (marginal productivity of labour in the 
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advanced region, WU) and MPLE (marginal productivity in the poorer region, WR).  Real 
wages are higher in the advanced region  (WU) in comparison with backward region (WR) as 
shown on the vertical axis of fig. 1 with employment at A (measured on the horizontal axis).   
 
In fig. 1 we show that after migration of labour from the backward to the advanced region, 
the equilibrium real wage will be W. The welfare gains are equal to  KED (advanced) + 
EDCJ (migrants); loss for backward region  FGJ = EJC.  Thus the net overall gain = EKDC.  
Incidentally, Hamilton and Whalley (1986) estimate this area for global perfect labour 
mobility.  Clearly, the size of the gain will depend on the degree of labour mobility, nature 
and quality of labour, substitutability or complementarity between different types of labour 
and the degree of labour absorption in the labour market given by the real wage flexibility.  
Inter alia, the greater the wage flexibility in the host country, the greater would be the 
welfare gain (Ghatak et al. 1996; Levine, 1999). 
 
It is known that in the original H-T model, uneducated labour has as much chance of getting a 
job as educated. Clearly, this is unrealistic. Hence, we now introduce two new assumptions in 
the H-T model. First, the probability of finding a job is also a function of the endowment of 
human capital (HC), 
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Figure 1: Employment and Real Wage alter Migration 
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thus individuals with a higher endowment of human capital will find a job more easily. Let 
HC be normalised in the interval (0,1). Then the probability of obtaining employment is 
assumed to be: 
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Both Bencivenga and Smith (1997) and Chaudhuri (2000) have developed models providing 
further modification of the H-T model, showing how urban unemployment and the informal 
sector can be understood within an H-T type model. 
 
The second assumption is that the utility of finding a house is H. Would-be migrants face a 
new uncertainty. If they stay in the rural sector they are certain about having a house 
available, but after migration, migrants may face a shortage of houses. The probability of 
finding a house Ph is given by 
ru NML
D
Ph

                                                                 (2.10) 
where D is the total amount of dwellings in the urban sector.  
Finally, let PG be a vector of quantities of n publicly provided goods such as health care and 
road infrastructure. Formally,  
 nPGPGPGPG ,...,, 21 .                                                       (2.11) 
The utility of publicly provided goods, Ug is independent on all other variables in the utility 
function. It is given by, 
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With these new conditions, the expected utility of migration becomes 
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and the utility of staying in the rural sector is 
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where the superscripts r and u refers to publicly provided goods in the rural and urban sector 
respectively. 
Equilibrium will be achieved when (2.13) equals (2.14). Solving for M in equilibrium results 
in 
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where b is the difference in utility between staying in the rural sector and migrating for 
unemployment without a house, this is 
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                                     (2.16) 
 
We require that individuals prefer to stay in the rural sector rather than to migrate for 
unemployment without a house, such that b > 0, a sufficient condition for M>0 in (2.15) is 
bbu rWWHC  )(                                                  (2.17) 
which implies that the difference between wages in the formal and informal sector, corrected 
for human capital should be greater than b. Think about two extreme cases. First, if HC is the 
minimum possible, zero, migration will hardly take place because the probability of obtaining 
employment is zero. Second, if HC is the maximum value, one, then migration will take place 
if the plain difference between wages in the formal and informal sector is larger than the 
utility difference of staying and leaving for the informal sector without a house. If inequality 
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(2.17) does not hold, then M > 0 only if there are enough dwellings available in the urban 
sector to compensate. 
 
The effect of changes in housing, human capital and publicly provided goods on migration is 
given by the following derivatives: 
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It follows that if b > 0 and wages in the formal sector are higher than in the informal sector, 
then (2.18), (2.19) and (2.20) are positive, while (2.21) is negative. Therefore any marginal 
increase in dwellings, human capital or in any publicly provided good in the urban sector will 
increase migration; while any marginal increase in publicly provided goods in the rural sector 
will deter migration. 
 
 
 
3. Background and data sources. 
 
There has been growing polarisation of the Polish economic space since the start of the 
Transitional Programme in 1989 with some regions growing much faster than others (Ghatak 
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et al. 2005). However the pattern of inter-regional
4
 migration within Poland throughout the 
same period only faintly reflects this polarisation
5
. Clearly, the lack of labour mobility from 
the low-productivity to high-productivity regions adversely affects efficiency and gains in 
output and employment. This has been explained in Fig.1. 
 
 Firstly, we locate our model of migration within the developing themes in the literature. 
Thus we test the extent to which inter-regional migration flows are correlated with: 
 
A) relative economic opportunity, measured by regional differences in wage rates  and 
unemployment - the Harris and Todaro (1970) hypothesis. In the case of Poland there is a 
lack of regional data on wages for the time period we are studying. Wages therefore 
proxied by GDP per capita in our model. 
B) regional facilities (particularly publicly provided facilities) - the Tiebout (1956) 
hypothesis. In our model we test for road infrastructure, health and housing facilities. In 
the faster growing regions these factors act as agglomeration economies thus increasing 
regional productivity, raising wage rates and attracting inward migration. 
C)  the relative distance migrants have to travel - the Hatton-Williams (1998) hypothesis. 
This     proxies for the cost of migration. 
D) the impact of human capital on migration patterns (Dustmann 1996).  
 
The theory behind these views of migration, the choice of our model and the choice of 
variables has been built on previous research in this area as well as our developing 
understanding of the forces of inter-regional migration. 
 
                                               
4 By regions in Poland we refer to the structure of 16 voivodships that comprise the economy. 
 
 12 
Secondly, we locate our paper within the specific and limited research on inter-regional 
migration within Poland. Deichmann and Henderson (1996) clearly emphasize low internal 
migration as a serious problem in impeding efficiency and economic growth within Poland. 
They indicate that regional migration declined in the first half of the 1990s (especially rural-
urban migration) and that population levels seemed frozen at sub-optimal urbanization levels. 
They also indicate that migration patterns within the country did not appear to respond to 
unemployment differentials and point to the housing shortage as the most likely candidate for 
explanation
6
. Bornhorst and Commander (2004) also recognise the efficiency lost due to the 
low migration rates within Poland and point to the poor housing market as its cause. Our 
paper complements some of their research, for example the continuing decline of internal 
migration in the second half of the 1990s (see fig.2 in Appendix); the importance of the 
Polish housing situation as a block to regional migration; the low priority of health decisions 
in the migration pattern.  Other studies of transitional economies have noted similar trends of 
low migration and differing regional growth rates (e.g. Fidrmuc 2003). With the aid of a 
rigorous econometric method of testing for the explanatory variables of inter-regional 
migration and with the availability of key data since 1995-1996, we are now able to test more 
deeply for the causes of migration within Poland and obtain results based on robust 
econometrics. 
 
In accord with the theory elucidated in section 2 and also in accord with other countries' 
experience
7
 we expect that within Poland regional migration is correlated positively with 
                                                                                                                                                  
5 Official inter-regional migration figures greatly understate the amount of "temporary economic migration" 
(spending the working week in one region while returning home at weekends) that is taking place in Poland 
6 Other studies of Poland had indicated already this  housing  shortage (Mayo 1988).  Studies in other counties 
also confirm the importance of this variable. For example Cameron and Muellbauer (2000) with reference to UK 
regional migration note " The housing market therefore has an important impact on regional convergence". 
7 Hazans (2001) shows with regard to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania that while registered internal migration has 
been declining in the post -Soviet era,  nevertheless  the existing migration patterns follow  traditional 
explanations: regional unemployment, and wage differentials . He also notes the importance of human capital as 
a factor in the migration pattern. Much of this resembles the Polish experience described in this paper. Similarly 
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GDP per capita (our proxy for wages) and negatively with unemployment in the faster 
growing regions. These regions therefore pull in workers from the slower growing regions. 
We expect that general infrastructure facilities in the faster growing regions act as magnets 
for migration, being expressions of agglomerations economies in these areas. Thus we expect 
that housing and road transport facilities will be positively signed on their coefficients. Health 
facilities are our only doubt. While consistency would demand we give it the same sign and 
expectation as the previous two variables, prior research (Deichmann and Henderson, 1996)  
indicates that migration was accompanied by worsening health statistics in the first half of the 
1990s in Poland. By implication therefore Polish workers were moving to industrial areas in 
spite of the health hazards. Our inclusion of the variable of infant health (proxying for health 
facilities) remains open therefore as to expectation of sign. Distance to be travelled by the 
migrant, as proxy for the cost of migration, is assumed to be negatively signed. Human 
capital, as explained in Section 2, is expected to be positively correlated with migration. 
 
All data has been drawn  from the web site of the Polish Central Statistical Office (Glowny 
Urzad Statystyczny, GUS: www.stat.gov.pl) This data comprises regional data on the 
following: migration, unemployment, GDP per capita, housing, secondary school education, 
infant mortality, road provision and population numbers.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
in Russia internal migration is of low intensity  but nevertheless is determined by economic factors (Andrienko 
and  Guriev 2004). 
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4. Empirical specification and results 
 
For empirical estimation we follow  
jijiwithXM ijtijtjiijt  16...1,                             (4.1) 
where Mijt is the natural logarithm of migration from province i to province j;  i and j are 
fixed effects for donor and destination provinces respectively, used to catch spatial 
heterogeneity; and  X is a vector of explanatory variables which are as follows: 
Yjt (Yit): natural logarithm of GDP per capita (proxy for wages) in destination 
province (donor province). 
 Ujt (Uit): natural logarithm of unemployment in destination province (donor province). 
DWt: natural logarithm of the number of dwellings per thousand population in 
destination region. 
HCt: is the natural logarithm of the number of students enrolled in secondary schools 
including vocational, basic and especial schools per thousand population in donor 
province. 
D: is the road distance in kilometres between the capitals of provinces i to j, which we 
proxy for migration costs. 
RDjt (RDit): natural logarithm of density of road length in destination province (donor 
province). 
IMjt (IMit): rate of infant mortality in destination province (donor province). 
 
The latter two variables are used to test the incidence of publicly provided goods. RD is a 
proxy for infrastructure and IM for health care. Three different models are estimated, the first 
does not take into account publicly provided goods, the second only infrastructure while the 
third uses all variables. 
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Some migration studies use symmetrical models, in which explanatory variables such as 
unemployment and GDP per capita are ratios or differences between donor and destination 
provinces. This may imply strong assumptions such as perfect information. Migrants may not 
react equally to changes in labour markets in far provinces compared to those in home region 
for which more information is available (Taylor and Martin 2001). Furthermore, Bornhorst 
and Commander (2004) suggest that lack of information about job opportunities in other 
regions may be a cause of the low rates of migration in transition economies. Therefore, 
equation (4.1) uses the less restrictive asymmetrical specification.  
 
The data used for estimation of equation (4.1), consists of 16 Polish provinces (voidvodships) 
with observations from 1995 to 2001. Each cross section comprises one single destination 
province. Therefore, there are 16 cross sections and 105 observations in each, which totals 
1640 observations. 
 
OLS estimates following the LSDV method were first used. Tests for groupwise 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation were carried out and results indicate that these 
hypotheses cannot be rejected. Thus OLS estimators remained unbiased, but were not 
efficient. For this reason and in interest of brevity these are not reported here. Given these 
results, Zellner’s (1962) Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations (SURE) were used. 
 
Two different estimators of SURE are shown. Table 1 shows Feasible Generalised Least 
Squares (FGLS). Estimators in this table are obtained by estimating the variance-covariance 
matrix of errors by OLS and then using these estimates to compute GLS estimators of the 
model. Table 2 shows Maximum Likelihood estimator (ML), in which case, the process of 
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obtaining estimates of the variance-covariance matrix is iterated until convergence. Both 
estimators are asymptotically equivalent and are reported for comparison purposes. Table 2 
contains our preferred model (model 3). 
 
Results are very similar across the two different estimators, the main difference being that in 
the second unemployment in the donor region (Uni) now becomes significant at the 5% level  
while road infrastructure for destination region (RDj) from being insignificant in Table 1 just 
approaches the 5% significance range in Table 2 - for all practical purposes however we can 
say that with a t-statistic of 1.99 it is a significant variable. However road infrastructure in 
donor regions (Rdi) in both tables proved insignificant.  Our health variable proved 
insignificant - not unexpected given the evidence of previous research. Health issues do not 
seem to be part of the migrants’ decision making process.  For the sake of brevity we shall 
comment on the results of Table 2 since these are our preferred results. All variables in Table 
2 (except for health which we left open) have the expected signs. 
 
 Yi, Uj and D are highly significant.  Yj  and Ui  also prove significant though somewhat less 
so. Thus our results for Poland generally confirm traditional theory that internal migration 
follows the incentives and disincentives of relative regional opportunity and cost of 
migration. In explaining migration decisions specifically in Poland however, GDP in the 
destination province is important but not as much as in the donor province. Unemployment in 
the donor province is also significant though less so than the unemployment situation in the 
destination province. Distance is a very important explanatory variable for migration thus 
lending support to gravity type models. Housing facilities in the destination region (DW) and 
the educational background of the migrant (HC) are both highly significant with both SURE 
estimators. Finally, road provision (RD) is significant only for destinations regions in our 
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preferred Table 2. Health, proxied by infant mortality in our model (IM)  is not significant - 
thus indicating that workers are moving for principally narrower economic motives.  
 
It follows from equation (4.1) that coefficients estimated are elasticities of migration with 
respect to their variables. Almost all elasticities are stable across the different models and 
estimators. Elasticity of migration with respect to GDP per capita in destination province is 
about 0.3, while with respect to GDP per capita in source province it is about -0.7. Thus the 
effect of GDP per capita in home regions is much stronger than in destination regions. The 
elasticity of unemployment in destination regions is about -0.3; while in source province it is 
close to zero. The elasticity of distance is about -1.7 and the elasticity of human capital is 
about 0.3. 
 
The elasticity of migration with respect to housing is the largest reported at around 9 i.e. a 1% 
increase in available dwellings will increase migration by about 9%. Given the low levels of 
internal migration observed in Poland and given these results, it seems that housing is a key 
factor deterring inter-regional migration. An increase in the number of dwellings is the most 
effective way to boost migration. 
 
After housing, the largest elasticity is that of distance. Migration to more distanced areas is 
discouraged. This effect is weaker than that of housing but is stronger than that of traditional 
factors such as unemployment and GDP per capita. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
Our paper expands the traditional studies of inter-regional migration with a  theoretical model 
and its empirical analysis with the integration of new variables.  In addition to GDP per 
capita and unemployment in source and destination provinces, as well as distance between 
provinces, the effect of housing, human capital and publicly provided goods are also studied 
in our model in the light of the special characteristics of the transitional economies.  
 
Polish regional migration is low by international standards - a feature noted in other 
transitional economies.  However the migration that does exist follows economic patterns 
being influenced by relative regional economic opportunities and costs. Evidence shows that 
GDP per capita and unemployment have a strong effect on internal migration. However, GDP 
per capita in the donor province has a stronger influence than in the destination province. 
Unemployment has a stronger impact on migration in destination rather than donor provinces. 
Such asymmetry reinforces the assumption of imperfect information. 
 
 In accord with the gravity model migration is negatively affected by distance. We have 
found evidence that such migration is also influenced by regional facilities, which we have 
measured in terms of road infrastructure, health and housing.  Lack of housing in particular 
has proved to be a major explanation for the low levels of migration.  Health has not played 
an important role in migration decisions in Poland. Road infrastructure in the destination 
region does play a part in the story. Finally the human capital quality of the migrant plays an 
important role in migration since provinces with increased education tend to provide more 
migration. 
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It follows from these findings that in order to encourage greater labour mobility for reaping 
efficiency gains an important policy decision for the Polish government is to provide more 
practical housing for key workers in those regions with growth potential. Regional facilities 
can also be improved thus providing the infrastructure necessary for increased employment. 
Finally greater educational provision helps migration. The better educated migrant is more 
equipped to find work, long term employment and a higher wage. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1. SURE - FGLS  
i = donor province 
j = destination province       
 
 
 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
       
Yj 0.312270 2.204338 0.283441 1.958233 0.351483 2.395126 
  (0.0276)  (0.0504)  (0.0167) 
Yi -0.689939 -5.946880 -0.663047 -5.518536 -0.603709 -4.994133 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Unj -0.200051 -4.126762 -0.192704 -3.905802 -0.200564 -4.048255 
  (0.0000)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Uni -0.024531 -0.562529 -0.016497 -0.373800 -0.007922 -0.184010 
  (0.5738)  (0.7086)  (0.8540) 
DW 7.124814 4.524636 7.068580 4.482521 6.843659 4.345957 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
DS -1.722519 -108.6755 -1.722305 -108.7082 -1.723011 -108.7631 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
HC 0.311662 4.361559 0.332297 4.497642 0.329944 4.569111 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
RDj   0.301865 1.477836 0.251654 1.197591 
    (0.1396)  (0.2312) 
RDi   0.028936 0.172410 0.003887 0.023974 
    (0.8631)  (0.9809) 
Imj     -0.023297 -0.318641 
      (0.7500) 
Imi     0.198778 3.070004 
      (0.0022) 
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Fixed Effects - Source Province      
DOLNOŚLĄSKIE 0.190405  0.185237  0.146874  
KUJAWSKO-POMORSKIE -0.640570  -0.643759  -0.665893  
LUBELSKIE -0.374125  -0.367494  -0.361241  
LUBUSKIE -0.842822  -0.839607  -0.844056  
ŁÓDZKIE -0.641518  -0.639110  -0.631225  
MAŁOPOLSKIE -0.640473  -0.648831  -0.622243  
MAZOWIECKIE 0.550000  0.537892  0.519472  
OPOLSKIE -1.223800  -1.221608  -1.196914  
PODKARPACKIE -0.658238  -0.650306  -0.621883  
PODLASKIE -0.891696  -0.879221  -0.862830  
POMORSKIE -0.026862  -0.026955  -0.026388  
ŚLĄSKIE 0.523797  0.503987  0.472633  
ŚWIĘTOKRZYSKIE -1.159413  -1.157513  -1.142957  
WARMIŃSKO-MAZURSKIE -0.451975  -0.444951  -0.420941  
WIELKOPOLSKIE -0.358056  -0.361799  -0.359762  
ZACHODNIOPOMORSKIE 0.438344  0.444181  0.409796  
Fixed Effects - Destination Province      
DOLNOŚLĄSKIE -21.92823  -21.78174  -22.06415  
KUJAWSKO-POMORSKIE -22.31163  -22.18542  -22.46861  
LUBELSKIE -22.24050  -22.08464  -22.36138  
LUBUSKIE -22.44127  -22.21896  -22.52255  
ŁÓDZKIE -23.38518  -23.23097  -23.49031  
MAŁOPOLSKIE -21.65999  -21.62388  -21.91237  
MAZOWIECKIE -21.85682  -21.71024  -22.00965  
OPOLSKIE -22.79659  -22.65274  -22.94522  
PODKARPACKIE -21.49236  -21.30968  -21.62373  
PODLASKIE -22.87722  -22.64980  -22.93493  
POMORSKIE -21.33457  -21.15893  -21.46637  
ŚLĄSKIE -22.01903  -22.00502  -22.26250  
ŚWIĘTOKRZYSKIE -22.98776  -22.85167  -23.13089  
WARMIŃSKO-MAZURSKIE -21.82948  -21.61962  -21.92002  
WIELKOPOLSKIE -21.60433  -21.45942  -21.77009  
ZACHODNIOPOMORSKIE -21.30883  -21.05067  -21.36034  
       
R-squared 0.873970  0.873922  0.874159  
       
       
Note: Probabillity of t-Statistics in parenthesis     
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Table 2. SURE - ML 
i = donor province 
j = destination province 
       
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
       
Yj 0.315091 2.674913 0.284040 2.364447 0.316233 2.611109 
  (0.0075)  (0.0182)  (0.0091) 
Yi -0.783222 -7.399060 -0.751399 -6.829158 -0.698041 -6.367656 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Unj -0.245196 -5.738220 -0.251447 -5.891795 -0.263271 -6.137353 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Uni 0.069504 1.863415 0.088506 2.322145 0.093815 2.519503 
  (0.0626)  (0.0203)  (0.0118) 
DW 9.473241 7.361655 9.071592 6.916685 8.562876 6.474561 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
DS -1.749548 -113.2608 -1.740803 -113.6154 -1.748879 -114.1249 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
HC 0.329481 5.544738 0.330199 5.359525 0.324837 5.314442 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
RDj   0.549256 2.676696 0.416990 1.987408 
    (0.0075)  (0.0470) 
RDi   -0.098132 -0.726289 -0.121829 -0.923166 
    (0.4678)  (0.3561) 
Imj     -0.072393 -1.022795 
      (0.3066) 
Imi     0.168409 3.243366 
      (0.0012) 
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Fixed Effects - Source 
Province       
DOLNOŚLĄSKIE -0.182196  -0.178630  -0.225668  
KUJAWSKO-POMORSKIE -0.561674  -0.543967  -0.574108  
LUBELSKIE -0.333992  -0.300385  -0.332056  
LUBUSKIE -0.830078  -0.826570  -0.850330  
ŁÓDZKIE -0.696986  -0.669829  -0.692912  
MAŁOPOLSKIE -0.597929  -0.537452  -0.521118  
MAZOWIECKIE 0.664438  0.650911  0.673788  
OPOLSKIE -1.325446  -1.234080  -1.253529  
PODKARPACKIE -0.714359  -0.700899  -0.690114  
PODLASKIE -0.694006  -0.705221  -0.686227  
POMORSKIE 0.065693  0.071352  0.062009  
ŚLĄSKIE 0.319078  0.340986  0.340356  
ŚWIĘTOKRZYSKIE -1.042017  -0.993264  -1.017642  
WARMIŃSKO-MAZURSKIE -0.338240  -0.342880  -0.307392  
WIELKOPOLSKIE -0.353065  -0.316501  -0.351074  
ZACHODNIOPOMORSKIE 0.612002  0.583797  0.551136  
Fixed Effects - Destination Province      
DOLNOŚLĄSKIE -34.61984  -32.52596  -30.49414  
KUJAWSKO-POMORSKIE -34.88830  -32.84256  -30.82420  
LUBELSKIE -34.83407  -32.73575  -30.73450  
LUBUSKIE -34.99786  -32.77779  -30.81480  
ŁÓDZKIE -36.29590  -34.15867  -32.09604  
MAŁOPOLSKIE -34.10316  -32.24794  -30.24128  
MAZOWIECKIE -34.64666  -32.55524  -30.51882  
OPOLSKIE -35.36269  -33.28548  -31.29931  
PODKARPACKIE -33.78765  -31.67575  -29.75932  
PODLASKIE -35.52784  -33.29105  -31.30599  
POMORSKIE -33.83384  -31.71215  -29.74363  
ŚLĄSKIE -34.83542  -32.97744  -30.86273  
ŚWIĘTOKRZYSKIE -35.54686  -33.48045  -31.47959  
WARMIŃSKO-MAZURSKIE -34.27180  -32.07850  -30.13073  
WIELKOPOLSKIE -34.08789  -32.02785  -30.06180  
ZACHODNIOPOMORSKIE -33.85749  -31.57277  -29.61117  
       
R-squared 0.854439  0.853509  0.853638  
       
       
Note: Probabillity of t-Statistics in parenthesis      
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Fig.2. Declining inter-regional inward migration in Poland: 1995-2001 
 
Fig 3. GDP in Polish regions: 1995-2001 
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Fig 4. Unemployment in Polish regions 
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